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Structural Breaks in Military Expenditures: 
Evidence for Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria 
 
Aamer S. Abu-Qarn and Suleiman Abu-Bader 




This paper endogenously determines the timing of structural breaks in military 
expenditures and military burdens for the major parties involved in the Israeli-Arab conflict, 
namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria over the period 1960-2004. Utilizing a test proposed 
by Vogelsang (1997), we find that all these countries experienced structural breaks, though at 
different periods in the late 70s and during the 80s. These structural breaks mark a sharp 
decline in the military burden that can be attributed to the peace talks that were initiated 
shortly after the 1973 war. When applying the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) multiple 
structural break tests we detect two structural breaks for every country. The first break 
occurred during the 60s and demonstrated a significant rise in the military burden prior to the 
1973 war, whereas the second break occurred in the late 70s and during the 80s and was 
characterized by a sharp decline in the military burden following the instigation of peace 
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Structural Breaks in Military Expenditures: 




The historical visit of the Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 
marked a significant milestone in the Israeli-Arab conflict. The subsequent peace treaty and 
the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Desert, the peace talks with the Palestinians, and the 
peace treaty with Jordan further boosted hopes for bringing about an end to the long-lasting 
conflict. However, stalled Israeli-Palestinian talks coupled with the outbreak of the second 
Intifada in 2000 as well as the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war have underscored the devastatingly 
volatile nature of the conflict and undermined any chances for a long-lasting peace in the 
Middle East. 
Three Arab countries, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, have constituted the front line against 
the State of Israel since its establishment in 1948. Significant shares of the limited resources 
of these countries, in addition to aid from the rich Gulf countries to the Arab side and 
generous American aid to Israel, have been allocated to military expenditures. The military 
burden, defined as the share of military expenditures in GDP, of the four parties has been 
among the highest in the world for many years now and obviously has had an adverse impact 
on economic growth.
1 Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the military burden over the period 
1960-2004. The graph shows that the military burden of the four countries peaked in the mid 
and late 70s to reach 0.55 for Egypt, 0.25 for Israel, 0.45 for Jordan, and 0.29 for Syria. The 
relative calm of the 90s with the initiation of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks resulted in a sharp 
decline in the military burden to a level of less than 0.1. Despite this drastic decline the 
military burden of the four countries is extremely high when compared with international 
standards. For example, the world’s average military burden during the period 1990-2005 
was 2.5%. In the same period, the military burden for the US was less than 4% despite its 
engagement in anti-terrorism wars and military actions in the aftermath of September 11. A 
similar pattern of decline is also observed in the real military expenditures (Figure 2). The 
Arab countries experienced a sharper decline than Israel. For Israel, threats at other fronts 
(Lebanon and the Occupied Territories) led to maintaining high military expenditures, 
although its share of GDP dropped significantly. There is no doubt that the decline of military 
burden in the Middle East was, at least partially, the product of the cessation of the state of   3
war between Israel and Egypt and Jordan and the commencement of direct negotiations 
between Israelis and Palestinians.   
Most of the studies to date that addressed the economic aspects of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict focused either on the causality between military expenditures and economic growth 
(Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987; Linden, 1992; Cohen et al., 1996; DeRouen, 2000; Abu-Bader and 
Abu-Qarn, 2003; and Yildirim et al., 2005) or the causal relationships between the military 
expenditures of the warring parties (McGuire, 1982, 1987; Linden, 1991; Chen et al., 1996, 
Beenstock, 1998; and Lebovic, 2004).      
In this paper we take a different approach for investigating the links between military 
expenditures and political developments by assessing whether Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
Syria experienced statistically significant structural breaks in both real military expenditures 
and the military burden over the period 1960-2004 and determine the timing of such breaks 
and its association with the political developments in the region. By this means, we attempt to 
identify patterns in the military outlays and examine whether they reflect hostile activities as 
well as the peace negotiations that took place during the last four decades. To do so, we apply 
a sequential test of structural breaks developed by Vogelsang (1997) to endogenously 
determine the timing of such structural breaks if any exist. The test that is valid for both 
stationary and unit root series, and allows both linear and quadratic trending of the data. 
Additionally, we allow more than a single breakpoint by using the Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003) test for multiple endogenous breakpoints in military expenditures. These tests are 
widely used for determining the timing of structural breaks of many economic variables but 
have not been applied to military expenditures. The only exception is a recent paper by 
Amara (2006) who applies the Bai and Perron (2003) test to determine the timing of the 
structural breaks in defense expenditures of NATO members.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the major 
developments in the Israeli-Arab conflict that may have shaped the pattern of defense 
expenditures of the involved parties. Section 3 describes our dataset and its resources. The 
econometric methodologies are described in section 4. Our results are presented in section 5. 
A summary and some concluding remarks are provided in section 6. 
2. The Israeli-Arab Conflict: A Timeline
2 
  Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 the Middle East region has 
undergone several wars and numerous military actions. In 1947 the United Nations proposed 
a “Partition Plan” that called for the establishment of two independent states for Arabs and 
Jews in Palestine. However, the Arabs rejected this plan and shortly after the withdrawal of   4
the British mandate forces and the independence declaration of Israel they declared war on 
Israel. At the end of the “Independence War” or “Al-Nakba” (the disaster), hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians were expelled and more than half of the area allotted to Arabs 
under the UN plan was controlled by Israel. 
  Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal by President Nasser and the blockade 
of the Tiran Straits to Israeli shipping in 1956, Israel, backed by Britain and France, invaded 
and subsequently occupied the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Soviet warning for 
intervention on behalf of Egypt and American economic pressures forced the three parties to 
withdraw from the occupied lands by early March 1957. The hostile operations reached a 
peak in 1967 when in a massive and quick assault that lasted for six days, Israel succeeded in 
seizing the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the 
Golan Heights from Syria.  
On October 6, 1973 Israel was caught by surprise as the Egyptian and Syrian forces 
coordinated a joint attack and advanced beyond the cease-fire lines into Sinai and the Golan 
Heights and inflicted heavy casualties on the Israeli Army. Israel counter-attacked and 
pushed the Egyptian and Syrian armies back advancing deep into Egypt and Syria. A 
ceasefire ended the war and paved the way for peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel 
that culminated in a peace treaty in 1979. According to this agreement, the state of war 
between the two countries was terminated, Israel pulled out its armed forces and civilians 
from Sinai, and normal diplomatic relations were established. However, this dramatic 
Egyptian move was confronted by a unified Arab front that objected to a separate peace 
treaty that neglected the Palestinian issue. Moreover, Egypt was suspended from the Arab 
League, and most Arab countries cut their diplomatic relations with Egypt. 
Once the Israel-Egypt peace treaty was finalized, the focus shifted to the Palestinian 
issue. The articles in the treaty that called for the establishment of an autonomous self-
governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza were never materialized. Palestinian forces 
were stationed in Southern Lebanon under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and initiated attacks on Northern Israel. On June 1982, Israel launched a 
massive assault on Palestinian targets in Southern Lebanon with the stated objective of 
pushing PLO forces to the north. Israel extended its operations deep into Lebanon beyond the 
initial plan and many Lebanese cities, including Beirut, and Syrian military targets were 
bombed and suffered heavy destruction and casualties. After a long siege of Beirut, PLO 
forces were forced out of Lebanon and Israel withdrew from most of the Lebanese territories,   5
however, Israel maintained a “security zone” of approximately 10 miles north of the border 
that was eventually evacuated in 2000. 
 The growing frustration among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories over the 
status quo, their suffering under the occupation, and the lack of progress towards a permanent 
solution to their nationalistic claims led to many violent incidents and confrontations with the 
Israeli Army in late 1987. The Intifada (uprising) that began in Gaza and spread to other 
cities and villages involved hundreds of thousands of people including children, teenagers 
and women. This popular resistance included not only stone throwing, burning tires, Molotov 
cocktails and the erection of barricades but also massive demonstrations, general strikes, 
refusal to pay taxes, and boycotts of Israeli products. The Palestinian uprising continued, 
though to a lower intensity, until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. In the midst of this 
period Israel suffered a massive missile attack by Iraq when the US backed by a wide 
international coalition drove Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. The end of the Gulf War paved the 
way to direct negotiations between Israel and Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and a 
joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation that excluded the PLO due to Israel’s objection) in 
Madrid in 1991 under the sponsorship of the US and USSR. 
Several rounds of negotiations and the subsequent recognition of Israel by the PLO 
brought Israel and the PLO together for more intensive rounds of confidential talks that 
culminated by the signing of the "Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements" in Oslo on August 20, 1993. The Oslo Accords called for the withdrawal of 
Israel from parts of Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority (a self-ruled entity that was extended later on to include more cities and villages in 
the West Bank) and negotiating for a permanent agreement that would begin no later than 
August 1996. The progress in the Israeli-Palestinian channel led to a peace treaty between 
Israel and Jordan in 1994 under which all the territorial and water disputes were resolved, and 
relations were normalized. 
The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 marked the escalation of hostile actions 
by Palestinians and Israelis when the negotiations on a permanent agreement ended in a 
deadlock. Currently, with Hamas in power and Israel, the US and Europe refusing to 
cooperate with Hamas led government, the odds for reviving the peace talks are at best slim. 
3. Econometric Methodologies 
Most of the previous work on military expenditures which have been devoted mostly 
to assessing causality between growth and military expenditures or the evolution of arms   6
races, for which it has relied on the traditional Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test. 
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and testing whether the coefficient of yt-1 is significantly different from zero. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis α=0 implies that the series is stationary, I(0).  
In his seminal article, Perron (1989) argued that failing to account for at least one 
structural break in the trend function may lead researchers who use the conventional unit root 
tests not to reject the null hypothesis of unit root process when in fact the series is stationary 
around a one time structural break. Contrary to many earlier studies that found that the US 
post-war GNP series is a unit root process, Perron (1989) showed that if the first oil shock in 
1973 is treated as a structural breakpoint in the trend function then one can reject the unit root 
hypothesis in favor of a trend stationary hypothesis.     
Zivot and Andrews (1992) suggested a variation of Perron’s (1989) test that allows 
endogenously determined breakpoints in the intercept, the trend function , or in both. In its 
general form (breaks in both the intercept and the trend function), the test entails running the 
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and k is the number of lags determined for each possible breakpoint by one of the information 
criteria.  
Equation (2) is sequentially estimated and TB is chosen so as to minimize the one-
sided t-statistics of the hypothesis α=0. Thus, the break point is the point least favorable to 
the null hypothesis of unit root process with a drift and excludes any structural breakpoints. 
  Since it is possible for an economic series to exhibit multiple breakpoints, Clemente et 
al. (1998) suggested a unit root test that allows for two changes in the mean of a series under 
the assumptions of either innovational (IO) or additive outliers (AO). For the case where the 
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where DTBi (i=1, 2) are pulse variables that take the value 1 if t=TBi+1 and zero otherwise, 
DUi are defined as in equation (2), and TB1 and TB2 are the dates when the shifts in the mean 
occur. Equation (3)is sequentially estimated and the unit root hypothesis is tested by 
obtaining the minimal value of the pseudo t-statistic for the hypothesis α=0 for all break time 
combinations.  
For the purpose of our work, we apply the test for detecting shifts in the trend function 
of a dynamic time series developed by Vogelsang (1997) which allows for both serial 
correlation and trending data, and is valid whether the series is stationary or not. Vogelsang 
(1997) addresses three cases of the trend function; no trend, linear trend, and quadratic trend 
for which the following regressions are, respectively, estimated: 
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where the dummy variables DU and DT are defined as in equation (2) and the truncation lag 
parameter, k, is selected as based on a procedure developed by Perron (1989). For any given 
break date, TB, we start with an a priori chosen upper bound kmax and test whether its 
coefficient is significant. If it is significant then the procedure is stopped and we choose 
k=kmax. Otherwise, we reduce the lag order by one and continue until the last lag becomes 
significant. If no lags are found to be significant, we choose k=0.   
  To endogenously determine the timing of the structural break with no ex ante 
preference for any particular year, we sequentially estimate equations (4, 4a, 4b) for each 
break year with 15 percent trimming from both ends of the sample (0.15T< TB <0.85T ) and 
calculate the Sub Wald (SubWt) statistic for the hypotheses  0 , 0 , 0 2 1 1 = = = = = = γ γ θ γ θ θ  
for the no trend, linear trend, and quadratic trend, respectively. The maximum SubWt is 
compared to the critical values tabulated by Vogelsang (1997). These critical values depend 
on the type of trend, whether the series is stationary or not, and the size of trimming. If the 
maximum SubWt exceeds the respective critical value, then we infer that a structural break 
has occurred at the period for which the statistic is maximal.   8
  Another test that allows multiple endogenous structural breaks was proposed by Bai 
and Perron (1998, 2003). Consider the following multiple regression with m breaks (and m+1 
regimes): 
) 1 ..., , 1 ; ..., , 1 ( 1
' + = + = + = − m j T T t x y j j t j t t ε β              (5) 
where y is the dependent variable, x is a vector of covariates, β is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients that may vary over time, ε is the disturbance term, T is the number of 
observations, and T0=0 and Tm+1=T by convention. In this study,  {} 1 = t x , i.e. we test for 
breakpoints in the mean of the series.
3 Under the above specification there are m+1 segments 
in which the regression coefficients are constant.  
To detect structural breaks, we first calculate the double maximum tests developed by 
Bai and Perron (1998) where the null hypothesis of no structural breaks is tested against the 
alternative of an unknown number of breaks. Once we get evidence of structural break of an 
unknown number of breaks we use the dynamic programming search algorithm that was 
proposed by Bai and Perron (2003) to determine the optimal number of breaks and their 
timing. The algorithm involves finding a global minimizer of the Residual Sum of Squares 
(RSS) or the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) over all possible combinations of up to m* 
given a number of breakpoints.    
4. Data Description and Sources 
Raw data were obtained from the following two main sources. (1) Real military 
expenditures in 2003 constant prices in US dollars as well as the share of military 
expenditures in GDP for the years 1988-2004 which were obtained from the SIPRI online 
database available at http://www.sipri.org. (2) Real military expenditures in 1993 constant 
prices in US dollars and the share of military expenditures in GNP for the period 1963-1987 
which were obtained from a database compiled by Beenstock (1998). For the years 1960-
1963 we derived the real GNP series using growth rates from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) online database (http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline), with the 
exception of Jordan for which the growth rates were taken from the PWT database available 
at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu. Military expenditures were converted to real 2000 prices US 
dollars using the GDP deflator and the GNP/GDP ratio series from the WDI online database. 
The final product consists of military expenditures in US dollars at 2000 constant prices and 
the military burden proxied by the share of military expenditures in GDP. 
We also constructed an aggregate series for the three Arab countries which we refer to 
it as “Arab.” For real military expenditures this series is simply the sum of the military   9
expenditures whereas for military burden, it is defined as this sum divided by the total GDP 
of these countries. These series are dominated by the figures for Egypt since its figures 
constitute the bulk of the “Arab” series. 
To conduct our tests we used Eviews 5.1 for the ADF test, and for the Vogelsang 
(1997) test. Stata 8 was used to conduct the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test as well as the 
Clemente et al. (1998) unit root test of double changes in the mean. The package strucchange 
of the open source statistical software R version 2.5.0 was utilized to detect multiple 
breakpoints based on Bai and Perron (2003).
4   
5. Results 
The Vogelsang (1997) test can be applied to both stationary and unit root series, 
although, the critical values differ. Since the critical values of the Vogelsang (1987) 
breakpoints test for stationary series are much lower than for unit root ones, relying on the 
traditional ADF may lead to infer that a series does not exhibit a structural break when in fact 
it does. Thus, we need to establish whether the series under investigation is stationary or has a 
unit root also in the presence of structural breaks in order to use the appropriate critical 
values. Table 1 shows that based on ADF, both the military burden and military expenditures 
variables have a unit root, I(1) for all countries. However, as we mentioned earlier, the test 
does not address the possibility of structure breaks in the series. When we subjected the series 
to the Zivot-Andrews unit root test (Table 2), the results remained the same except for Israel 
where the real military expenditures were found to be stationary when a break is allowed in 
both the intercept and the trend function. Likewise, the military burden was found to be 
stationary for the cases of breaks in the trend and in both the intercept and the trend function.. 
Table 3 presents the results of the Clemente et al. (1998) unit root test for up to two shifts in 
the mean of the series for both the AO and IO cases. Allowing two structural breaks in the 
mean of the series we found that in all but five cases the series are unit root. The exceptions 
are the Israeli military expenditures under the IO representation and the military burden under 
the AO assumption, Egypt’s military burden under IO, and Arab military expenditure under 
AO and the military burden under IO. Summing up the results of the unit root tests, we found 
that using the traditional ADF all the series have a unit root when in fact some series are 
stationary around a one or two structural breaks. 
  Once we have established which series are stationary and which are not, we used the 
Vogelsang (1997) test for detecting structural breaks, for both linear and quadratic trend 
functions with 15% trimming. Generally speaking, as graphs 3 and 4 demonstrate, a quadratic 
trend with a break seems to capture to a great extent the evolution of military expenditures   10
and military burden for all countries. Thus, we focus mainly on the results of the quadratic 
trend function which are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. We first examined real military 
expenditures and subjected them to the test. As Table 4 shows, all countries experienced 
significant structural breaks, though at different periods. Allowing for a quadratic trend 
function, we found that all countries went through a structural break in that can be associated 
with the peace process that gained momentum after the 1973 war. This is illustrated by a drop 
in the level of real military expenditures for all countries (Graph 3). Our results determined 
that 1985 was the likely breakpoint for Israel’s military expenditures. Due to the 
redeployment of the armed forces withdrawn from the Sinai Dessert and the invasion of 
Lebanon, Israel’s military spending did not drop so the post/pre-break ratio, 1.63, was 
relatively high. This ratio is deceiving, however, especially when the series has a positive 
trend, as is the case for Israel. As can be seen from Graph 3, the military expenditures after 
1985 continued to grow, though at a lower pace. When considering a ten year interval around 
the breakpoint, we find that the post/pre-break ratio of military expenditures for Israel was 
lower than one (0.81). 
Egypt experienced a structural break in 1975 following the 1973 war that many 
believed it to be the war that paved the way to peace negotiations that were officially initiated 
after the historical visit of Al-Sadat to Israel in 1977. The post-break military expenditures 
were about two thirds of the level that preceded the breakpoint and 0.72 when relating to the 
ten year interval around the breakpoint. For Jordan and Syria the breakpoints were in the 
early 80s (1981, and 1983, respectively). Unlike Egypt, the post/pre-breakpoint ratio was 
around one, meaning that the mean level did not change significantly. 
The sharp decline in the military burden for the four countries is clearly demonstrated 
in Graph 4. The trend function for all countries for the post-break period has a negative slope, 
indicating a continuous decline in military expenditures relative to GDP. Table 5 presents the 
results of the Vogelsang (1997) structural breakpoint tests for the military burden series. 
Once again, we focus on the quadratic trend function since it captures the evolution of the 
military burden of the four countries more closely than the linear trend function. While Egypt 
and Jordan, the two Arab countries that signed peace treaties with Israel, experienced 
structural breaks in the military burden in the mid-70s (1975 and 1974, respectively), both 
Israel and Syria who are still, at least officially, in a state of enmity experienced their 
structural breaks in the mid 80s (1985 and 1986, respectively). The post/pre-break ratio was 
less than one for all countries. The sharpest decline is recorded for Egypt for which the post-
break military burden was only 0.27 of the average level prior to the break. The test for the   11
aggregated Arab military burden yielded almost identical figures to those of Egypt. Similar 
results demonstrating a sharp decline in the military burden were obtained when we 
examined a ten-year interval around the break dates. 
Visual inspection of the real military expenditures and military burden (Graphs 1 and 
2) indicates the possibility of more than one breakpoint. To accommodate such a possibility 
we employed the Bai and Perron (2003) test of multiple breakpoints in the mean of the series, 
allowing for a maximum of two breaks.
5 The results reported in Table 6 indicate that all 
countries experienced significant structural breaks in their real military expenditures in the 
late 60s or early 70s. For all but Jordan, the post-break levels were substantially higher than 
before it. For instance, Egypt’s military expenditures shifted from a mean of 4144 to 10640 
after 1969, while Israel’s mean military expenditures shifted from 1900 to 8730 after its 
break year of 1972. The second breakpoints occurred at different times in the late 70s and 
during the 80s and were characterized by a sharp fall in military expenditures. An exception 
is Israel, whose second breakpoint was in 1982, and which was not followed by a decline in 
expenditures but rather by a modest rise possibly due to its invasion of Lebanon and the 
deployment of armed forces from the Sinai Peninsula to the Negev. We attempted to assess 
whether the four countries experienced structural breaks in the growth rates of the military 
expenditures, however, most of the breakpoints were either insignificant or only marginally 
significant. 
When we turn to examining the breakpoints in the military burden, we can observe a 
clear pattern in which all of the countries, except Jordan, experienced a sharp hike in the 
military burden in the late 60s and early 70s in the aftermath of the 1967 war and prior to the 
1973 war. The mean military burden for Egypt rose from 0.26 to 0.46 after 1969, whereas 
Israel’s military burden grew from 0.08 to 0.21 after the first breakpoint, 1972. Jordan did not 
witness a structural break in the military burden during the years of mounting tension in the 
region, but rather experienced its first breakpoint in 1981 with a plunge from 0.32 to 0.15. A 
further decline is detected in 1989 when the mean military burden drops to a level of 0.09. 
The optimistic atmosphere in the late 70s and during the 80s is captured by the second 
breakpoints, as manifested by a plunge to less than 0.1 with Egypt being the first to 
experience a drastic cut from about 0.46 to a level of 0.07 after 1977. The other countries 
experienced their breakpoints later in the late 80s. Israel’s military burden dropped 
considerably from a ratio of 0.21 to a ratio of 0.1 in the post-1986 period. The late breakpoint 
of Israel could be attributed to the continuation of hostile operations both in Lebanon and in   12
the Occupied Territories. A sharp decline in the military burden is also detected for Syria 
following its second breakpoint in 1986 when it reached a low of 0.07.  
Summing up, by allowing for two structural breaks we observe one break that is 
associated with hostile operations and another that reflects a sharp decline in the military 
burden following the initiation of peace talks. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has addressed the relationships between hostile operations and political 
developments on the one hand and military expenditures on the other hand for the four major 
parties involved in the Israeli-Arab conflict, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and Israel. Specifically, 
we applied tests for detecting endogenous structural breaks in military expenditures and the 
military burden over the period 1960-2004. We first utilized the Vogelsang (1997) test for a 
single structural break that allows for linear and quadratic trend functions. Second, we used 
the multiple structural break test of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to examine whether there 
were multiple breaks in the mean of the real military expenditures and in the military burden. 
These tests allowed us to detect the timing of significant changes in military expenditures in 
reaction to and/or in anticipation of major political developments and security threats.  
When allowing for a single structural break in the trend functions, we found that the 
quadratic trend function nicely captures the evolution of the military expenditures of the four 
countries. All countries were subject to significant structural breaks, though at different dates 
in the late 70s and early 80s, a period that marks the initiation of the peace talks, first between 
Egypt and Israel and later on between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians. These breakpoints 
reflected a sharp decline in military burden from levels of 0.2-0.3 to below 0.1. 
Tests of double shifts in the mean of military expenditures and burden pointed to two 
significant breakpoints that belong to two different regimes. The first breakpoint occurred in 
the late 60s and the early 70s and reflected the times of soaring military expenditures before 
the 1973 war. However, when peace negotiations were initiated in the late 70s, hopes of 
reaching a just and lasting peace for the long-lasting conflict were translated to a substantial 
reduction in military burden for all countries. 
Our results may provide us with a ray of hope since all countries have, in practice, 
translated their aspiration for peace and for an end to the conflict to major cuts in their 
military spending. With all the difficulties and obstacles, sounds of hope are still raised on 
both sides. Undoubtedly, not only the region but also the whole world would reap the 
dividends of peace.   13
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Table 1 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Country  Level  First Difference 
  k  ADF  k  ADF 
Military Expenditures 
Egypt  3  -2.83  4  -2.94** 
Israel  0  -1.96  0  -7.85*** 
Jordan  0  -2.38  0  -7.65*** 
Syria  1  -1.63  0  -5.04*** 
Arab  2  -2.41  1  -3.04** 
Military Burden 
Egypt  3  -2.89  4  -2.94** 
Israel  2  -1.62  0  -8.30*** 
Jordan  8  -3.04  1  -6.07*** 
Syria  0  -1.70  0  -7.96*** 
Arab  2  -2.71  3  -2.74* 
Notes 
•  Estimation with intercept and trend for the level and intercept for the first 
differences. Lag order is determined using AIC with a maximum of 8 lags allowed. 
•  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 - Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test 
Country  Intercept  Trend  Both 
  k  t  k
   t  k  t 
Military Expenditures 
Egypt  0  -3.36  0  -2.90  0  -3.35 
Israel  0  -4.33  0  -4.18  0  -5.40** 
Jordan  0  -4.04  0  -3.16  0  -4.36 
Syria  1  -4.30  1  -2.80  1  -4.62 
Arab  0  -3.68  0  -3.07  0  -3.54 
Military Burden 
Egypt  2  -3.60  2  -3.02  2  -4.54 
Israel  0  -3.49  0  -5.14***  0  -6.78*** 
Jordan  0  -3.93  0  -3.30  0  -4.25 
Syria  0  -4.00  0  -3.01  0  -3.85 
Arab  2  -3.28  2  -3.18  2  -3.80 
Notes: 
•  Estimation with 0.15 trimmed. Lag length is determined by general to specific method 
with a maximum of 8 lags allowed. 
•  Critical values – intercept: -5.43 (1%), -4.80 (5%); trend: -4.93 (1%), -4.42 (5%); both: 
-5.57 (1%), -5.08 (5%) 
•  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   19
 
Table  3 - Clemente et al. (1998) Unit Root Test 
Country  Additive Outliers  Innovative Outliers 
  Breaks  k  t  Breaks  k  t 
Military Expenditures 
Egypt  1  2  -2.44  1  5  -2.72 
Israel  2  0  -5.25  1  0  -4.27** 
Jordan  2  0  -3.13  2  0  -3.87 
Syria  2  0  -3.40  2  0  -4.79 
Arab  2  7  -5.64**  1  1  -2.85 
Military Burden 
Egypt  1  0  -2.43  1  8  -6.37** 
Israel  2  0  -5.80**  2  0  -4.55 
Jordan  2  0  -4.29  1  0  -4.12 
Syria  2  0  -3.65  2  0  -4.81 
Arab  2  0  -2.56  2  5  -8.90** 
 
Notes 
•  Estimation with 0.15 trimming. Maximum lags allowed 8.  
•  Critical values - single break: -4.27; two breaks: -5.49 
•  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.   20
 
Table 4 – Structural Breaks in Real Military Expenditures 
Country  Breakpoint  SupW  k  Post/Pre-Break 
Ratio 
Ratio of 10 
years  
around break 





i t i t t t y c DT DU t y
1
1 1  
Egypt  1975  21.7***  1  0.67  0.72 
Israel  1972  24.1*  1  4.87  2.77 
Jordan  1982  15.0**  1  1.00  0.77 
Syria  1985  29.5***  1  0.88  0.44 
Arab  1975  17.5***  1  0.86  0.88 










2 1  
Egypt  1975  35.1***  5  0.67  0.72 
Israel  1985  44.8***  0  1.63  0.81 
Jordan  1981  83.3***  0  1.04  0.80 
Syria  1983  30.1***  8  1.03  0.70 
Arab  1989  35.3***  8  0.55  0.55 
 
Notes: 
•  Estimation with 15% trimming and 8 maximum lags allowed. 
•  Critical values: Linear – 17.51(1%), 13.29(5%), 11.25(10%) for stationary and 30.36(1%), 
25.10(5%), 22.29(10%) for non-stationary series. Quadratic trend – 19.90(1%), 15.84(5%), 
13.96(10%) for stationary and 38.35(1%), 31.29(5%), 27.99(10%) for non-stationary series. 
•  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 – Structural Breaks in Military Burden 
Country  Breakpoint  SupW  k  Post/Pre-Break 
Ratio 
Ratio of 10 
years  
around break 





i t i t t t y c DT DU t y
1
1 1  
Egypt  1974  36.3***  8  0.31  0.68 
Israel  1972  318.1***  0  1.82  1.84 
Jordan  1976  21.0***  3  0.44  0.87 
Syria  1985  17.1**  1  0.37  0.41 
Arab  1974  41.6***  1  0.37  0.73 










2 1  
Egypt  1975  119.2***  7  0.27  0.48 
Israel  1985  53.3***  0  0.74  0.66 
Jordan  1974  85.4***  0  0.50  0.97 
Syria  1986  36.5***  1  0.35  0.37 
Arab  1975  91.8***  7  0.33  0.56 
 
Notes: 
•  Estimation with 15% trimming and 8 maximum lags allowed. 
•  Critical values: Linear – 17.51(1%), 13.29(5%), 11.25(10%) for stationary and 30.36(1%), 
25.10(5%), 22.29(10%) for non-stationary series. Quadratic trend – 19.90(1%), 15.84(5%), 
13.96(10%) for stationary and 38.35(1%), 31.29(5%), 27.99(10%) for non-stationary series. 
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Table 6 – Bai and Perron (2003) Test of Multiple Break Points 





















































































































•  Estimation with minimum 8 years between breakpoints. 
•  β1, β2, β3 denote the mean prior to the first breakpoint, the mean between the first and the 
second breakpoints, and the mean after the second breakpoint, respectively. 
•  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Notes
                                                 
1  Numerous studies emphasize the adverse effects of the high military burden on economic growth, such as Lim 
(1983), Deger and Smith (1985) and Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003). However, other studies have found a 
positive effect (Benoit, 1978) or no effect at all (Dakurah et al., 2001) of military spending on economic growth.  
2 Based mainly on Sachar (1998) and Morris (2001). Our purpose is to only provide a chronological survey of 
the conflict accounting for historical events rather than interpreting them, in order to understand the factors that 
shaped the patterns of military expenditures of the warring parties.   
3  We also performed the tests with a linear trend, however, in some cases the trend coefficients were not 
significantly different from zero. Moreover, it is easier to interpret the results of the breaks in the mean.  
4 For details see Zeileis et al. (2003). 
5  Indeed, the optimal number of breaks based on BIC was two for most of the cases.   24
References 
Abu Bader, S. and A. S. Abu Qarn (2003), 'Government Expenditures, Military Spending and 
Economic Growth: Causality Evidence from Egypt, Israel, and Syria', Journal of 
Policy Modeling, 25, 6-7, 567-83. 
Amara, J., (2006), 'NATO Defense Expenditures: Common Goals or Diverging Interests? A 
Structural Analysis',  2006/06 (Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval 
Postgraduate School). 
Bai, J. and P. Perron (1998), 'Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural 
Changes', Econometrica, 66, 1, 47-78. 
Bai, J. and P. Perron (2003), 'Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change 
Models', Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18, 1, 1-22. 
Beenstock, M. (1998), 'Country Survey XI: Defence and the Israeli Economy', Defence and 
Peace Economics, 9, 3, 171-222. 
Benoit, E. (1978), 'Growth and Defense in Developing Countries', Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 26, 2, 271-80. 
Chen, B.,Y. Feng and C. Masroori (1996), 'Collective Action in the Middle East? A Study of 
Free-Ride in Defense Spending', Journal of Peace Research, 33, 3, 323-39. 
Clemente, J.,A. Montanes and M. Reyes (1998), 'Testing for a Unit Root in Variables with a 
Double Change in the Mean', Economics Letters, 59, 2, 175-82. 
Cohen, J. S. and et al. (1996), 'Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Israel: The 
Indirect Link', Journal of Peace Research, 33, 3, 341-52. 
Dakurah, A. H.,S. P. Davies and R. K. Sampath (2001), 'Defense Spending and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries: A Causality Analysis', Journal of Policy Modeling, 
23, 6, 651-58.   25
Deger, S. and R. Smith (1985), 'Military Expenditure and Development: The Economic 
Linkages', IDS Bulletin, 16, 49-54. 
DeRouen, K., Jr (2000), 'The Guns-Growth Relationship in Israel', Journal of Peace 
Research, 37, 1, 69-83. 
Lebovic, J. H. (2004), 'Unity in Action: Explaining Alignment Behavior in the Middle East', 
Journal of Peace Research, 41, 2, 167-89. 
Lebovic, J. H. and A. Ishaq (1987), 'Military Burden, Security Needs, and Economic Growth 
in the Middle East', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31, 1, 106-38. 
Lim, D. (1983), 'Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries', 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 31, 2, 377-84. 
Linden, M. (1991), 'The Dynamics and the Instability of the Middle East Military 
Expenditures in Years 1955-1984', Defence Economics, 2, 3, 199-208. 
Linden, M. (1992), 'Military Expenditures, Government Size and Economic Growth in the 
Middle East in the Period 1973-85', Journal of Peace Research, 29, 3, 265-70. 
McGuire, M. C. (1982), 'U.S. Assistance, Israeli Allocation, and the Arms Race in the Middle 
East: An Analysis of Three Interdependent Resource Allocation Processes', Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 26, 2, 199-235. 
McGuire, M. C. (1987), 'Foreign Assistance, Investment, and Defense: A Methodological 
Study with an Application to Israel, 1960-1979', Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 35, 4, 847-73. 
Morris, B. (2001), Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. 
(Vintage Books: New York. 
Perron, P. (1989), 'The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis', 
Econometrica, 57, 6, 1361-401.   26
Sachar, H. M. (1998), A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (2nd ed.). 
(Knopf: New York. 
Vogelsang, T. J. (1997), 'Wald-Type Tests for Detecting Breaks in the Trend Function of a 
Dynamic Time Series', Econometric Theory, 13, 6, 818-49. 
Yildirim, J.,S. Sezgin and N. Ocal (2005), 'Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in 
Middle Eastern Countries: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis', Defence and Peace 
Economics, 16, 4, 283-95. 
Zeileis, A.,C. Kleiber,W. Kramer and K. Hornik (2003), 'Testing and Dating of Structural 
Changes in Practice', Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 44, 1-2, 109-23. 
Zivot, E. and D. W. K. Andrews (2002), 'Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-Price 
Shock, and the Unit-Root Hypothesis', Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 20, 1, 
25-44.   27
Biographical Notes 
AAMER S. ABU-QARN, b. 1969, PhD in economics (Northeastern University, 2002); 
Assistant Professor, Ben-Gurion University (2004-); Current main interests: Israeli-Arab 
conflict, productivity measurement, determinants of economic growth, mainly of the MENA 
region; Recent articles published in World Development, Review of Development Economics, 
and Journal of Policy Modeling.  
 
SULEIMAN ABU-BADER, b. 1963, PhD in economics (Cornell University, 1999); 
Assistant Professor, Ben-Gurion University (2002-); Current main interests: Israeli-Arab 
conflict, poverty measures, the effect of GATT/WTO on international trade; Recent articles 
published in World Development, Review of Development Economics, Journal of Policy 
Modeling, and Applied Economics.    